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RESTRICTING THE POWER TO PROMOTE




In several recent decisions thefederal appeals courts have adopted
a standardfor reviewing denials ofproposed bank combinations which
substantially restricts the ability offederal bank regulators to reject
anticompetitive combinations. Professor Carstensen analyzes the three
leading decisions and the litigating positions of the parties. He argues
that the results in these cases, although predictable, are inconsistent
with express statutory language, legislative history, past Supreme Court
construction of the relevant standard, ind thefundamentalpublicpolicy .
of avoiding unnecessarily anticompetitive combinations. He suggests
two ways in which the statute could be read which would preserve rea-
sonable judicial review of agency decisions without sacr~fcing the sub-.
stantive public interest in promoting competition.
Twenty years ago, the federal judiciary, primarily the Supreme
Court, began to encourage effective enforcement of competitive stan-'
dards in the banking industry.' Most subsequent scholarly investiga-
tions have found that competition is an important factor in making the
banking system operate in the public interest.2 These investigations
have concluded that the structure of the system, as measured by owner-
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am indebted to Cynthia Von
Bogaert for research assistance on this comment.
1. See, eg., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see also United States v. Philipsburg Nat'l
Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1967); United States
v. County Nat'l Bank, 339 F. Supp. 85 (D. VL 1972).
2. The debate in the vast literature on banking competition and economic performance con-
cerns not the effect of competition, but its significance'in producing desirable bank performance
relative to such other factors as size. See generally Edwards, The Banking Competition Contro-
versy, 3 NAT'L BANKING REv. 1 (1965); Heggestad, Market Structure, Competition, and.Perform.
once in Financial Industries: A Survey of Banking Studies in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REOULATION
449 (F. Edwards ed. 1979); Silberman, Economic Efficiency and Financial Reform: Commercial
Banks in FINANCIAL INsTItmONS AND MARKETs 563 (M. Polokoff ed. 1970).
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ship concentration and the number of potential entrants, strongly af-
fects long term competitiveness.3
Despite this overwhelming authority, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have recently chosen to fol-
low the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in ignor-
ing competitive effects as a key concern in banking.4 These courts have
commanded federal bank regulators to approve all bank mergers or
acquisitions, despite any resulting anti-competitive impact and failure
to serve the public interest, unless the agency can prove that the anti-
competitive effects render the combination unlawful under the Clayton
Act.5 Recent decisions interpreting Clayton Act standards indicate that
this burden may prove difficult to meet. 6 This rigorous standard con-
trasts sharply with the broad discretionary power granted to bank regu-
lators to reject bank combinations on other than competitive grounds7
and to reject bank charter applications 8 and branch applications 9 on
any ad hoc basis. The rule of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits can
compel agency approval of combinations that are prima facie undesir-
able, and will prevent federal bank regulators from making decisions
designed to promote competition in banking.' 0 Such a judicially cre-
ated rule, in the face of a statute requiring that the agency find gains to
the public interest clearly outweighing the combination's anti-competi-
3. See, e.g., Rhoades, Does Market Structure Matter in Commercial Banking?, 26 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 155 (1981). The basic tenets of general economic theory support the view that mar-
ket structure largely determines the extent of competition. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); Weiss, The Concentration Profits Relation-
shi and Antitrust in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184 (H. Goldschmid,
H. Mann, & J. Weston ed. 1974).
4. Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. FRB, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981); County Nat'l Bancorp. v.
FRB, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1973).
5. Mercantile Tex. Corp.
, 
638 F.2d at 1272; County Nat'l., 654 F.2d at 1260: Washington
Mut., 482 F.2d at 465; see also Southwest Miss. Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp. I (S.D. Miss. 1979),
aft'd, 625 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) (focusing on the rationality of the FDIC's market definition);
cf. Metzger and Greenfield, Agency Discretion to Deny Bank Merger: What are the Limits?, 98
BANKING .J. 838 (1981).
6. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979); BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC,
557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. See FRB v. First Lincoinwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
8. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973); Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484
F.2d 284. 289 (5th Cir. 1973); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1966).
9. See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 190 N.E.2d 107 (Mass. 1963)
(no review on merits of branch denial); see also Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions
of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1975).
10. The effects of the courts' rule may already have begun to appear. The Federal Reserve
Board has recently proposed redefining and narrowing its competitive concerns. 47 Fed. Reg.
9017 (1982); f Texas Commerce Bankshares, Inc., 68 Fed. Res. BulL 503, 504-05 (1982) (Gov.
Teetors, dissenting). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has also adopted this restricted ap-
proach. 12 C.F.R. § 571.5 (1982).
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tive effects," deserves particular attention now as banking and related
financial industries begin dramatic shifts in the scope and character of
their business.' 2
This article reviews the facts of the three cases establishing the rule
of "mandatory approval," and notes the competitive and non-competi-
tive factors in each. It then summarizes the courts' results, and, re-
turning to the facts of each case, analyzes the alternatives the parties
presented for review. The article then presents two alternative solu-
tions to the problem of public interest analysis in banking and com-
pares them with the courts' approach. The conclusion briefly considers
the implications of choosing among these alternatives for the future
regulation of banking and financial institution competition..
I. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE FACTS
The three cases involve mergers of differing competitive implica-
tions. The Eighth Circuit's County National Bancorporation v. FRB ' 3
presents the most obviously anti-competitive transaction, the Ninth
Circuit's Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. FDIC4 presents the least
and the Fifth Circuit's Mercantile Texas Corp. v. FRB15 falls some-
where in between.
A. County National.
In 1979, County National Bancorporation (County) proposed to
merge with T.G. Bank Shares (T.G.). Both firms were bank holding
companies in St. Louis, Missouri. County controlled five banks with
over $330 million in deposits, and T.G. controlled three banks in the
same market with total deposits exceeding $225 million.' 6 These hold-
ings made County and T.G. the sixth and tenth largest banking organi-
zations in the broadly-defined St. Louis market, 17 with 3.2% and 2.3%
of total bank deposits respectively.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1976) (bank merger), § 1842 (1976) (bank holding company
acquisition), quoted, infra note 56.
12. See Raven, Banks, Near Banks, andAlmost Banks: Expanding Competition Blurs Tradi-
tional Distinction Among Financial Institutions, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 389 (1981).
13. 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981). For a note reporting the decision, see 15 Creighton L. Rev.
789 (1982).
14. 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973).
15. 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. 654 F.2d at 1254.
17. Id at 1254. The Federal Reserve Board's market definition was perhaps unduly broad:
it included banks from counties near St. Louis in both Missouri and Illinois. In its briefs, the
Board tried to enhance the merging firm's market shares by suggesting that the two holding com-
panies competed very directly. Respondent's Brief at 21, 22-23, County Nat'l Bancorp. v. FRB,
-54 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as County Nat'i Respondent's Brief].
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Because County and T.G.'s banks competed directly with each
other, their combination would necessarily eliminate some consumer
choice in the market. To that extent, the combination had an anti-com-
petitive effect. The only remaining question was the extent of that ef-
fect. The size of the companies' lead banks showed that both County
and T.G. had succeeded as significant and effective competitors in the
St. Louis market.' 8 On the other hand, after the combination, a
number of other large banks and banking organizations would remain
in the market. Consequently, the reduction in competition would be
small, both in terms of the number of remaining choices and in terms
of the change in concentration of bank ownership. 19
What advantages did this combination offer the public? County
and T.G. alleged that it would permit "an expansion of services," par-
ticularly wholesale banking services. 20 The application also listed four-
teen other ways in which the combination would serve the public,2'
but, of these, two had no meaning,22 one served only a management
need,23 and the remaining eleven involved scale economies of a com-
bined entity or the enhanced capital available to the combined entity.24
18. Both holding companies' lead banks were among the 7 largest depositholders; each held
in excess of$150 million. County Nat'l Respondent's Brief, supra note 17, at 4. Such large banks
may compete more effectively, than smaller banks for commercial and industrial loans, see D.
ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETMON IN BANKING (1951), and the applicants strongly en-
dorsed this theory, Petitioners Brief at 18-21 app., County Nat'l Bancorp. v. FRB, 654 F.2d 1253
(8th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as County Nat'! Petitioner's Brie]].
19. The St. Louis market is relatively unconcentrated. See, e.g., County Nat'l Bancorp., 65
Fed. Res. Bull. 763, 764 (1979). Over 90 banking organizations operating over 150 banks would
have remained in the market area as defined by the Federal Reserve. County Nat'! Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 18, at 8.
20. County Nat'! Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at 5 app.
21. Id at 9-21.
22. The first two claims, see id at 9-12, alleged that each holding company had a "neighbor-
hood" orientation and that each had community development skills. These assertions had no
meaning to the combination decision because neither skill nor attitude Vould change by combin:
ing. Such skills are also easily acquirable in the market in many ways other than through
combination.
23. The companies claimed that the combination would provide management "strength" that
would allow the opening of two additional branches. Id at 13-14. Such "strength" could also be
achieved by hiring more, or better, managers and claims of this type are thus inherently suspect.
See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 190-92 (1968).
24. County Natl Petitioner's Brief supra note 18, at 12-18 app. Four claimed advantages
would arise from having expanded capital: the ability to set up a small business investment com-
pany, to establish more new offices, to establish a municipal bond department, and to offer larger
loans. The larger scale of the enterprise would allegedly allow equipment leasing, the attraction of
better managers, increased international banking service, the opening of a municipal bond depart-
ment, the provision of automatic teller machines and cash management service, the expansion of
automatic clearing house services, and the achievement of more economical banking functions.
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The County-T.G. merger was not the only path leading to the pur-
ported advantages of greater capital. Even if merger were a cheaper
way to raise capital than the issue of new stock,25 combination with
banks in or out of the market, but involving no competitive effect,
would yield the same result. Moreover, economies of scale would de-
rive wholly from increased total volume. No claim to geographic, let
alone bank-specific, sources of synergistic benefit was presented nor
would the logic of the companies' assertions seem to justify even a hy-
pothetical allegation to this effect. Therefore, this merger was not the
only way to achieve the results that County and T.G. cited as beneficial
to the public interest.26
B. Mercantile Texas.
Mercantile Texas Corp. v. PAB27 raised concerns about a loss of
potential competition in certain markets. Mercantile was the fifth larg-
est banking organization in Texas, owning 9 banks with $2.8 billion in
deposits. 28 It targeted Pan National for acquisition, a company operat-
ing four banks in El Paso and one in Waco with combined deposits of
$622 million.29 Pan National held a leading position in both of these
highly concehtrated areas.30 Mercantile, however, did not operate any
banks in either area31 and therefore was not in direct competition with
Pan National. Both the El Paso and Waco markets were growing and
attractive for entry;32 Mercantile could have entered both in ways other
than merger.
The high market concentrations in El Paso and Waco meant that
oligopolistic behavior would probably occur in each market if sufficient
25. Whiy merger would be cheaper than issuing new stock is an anomaly best left for others to
explain. It seems clear, however, that merger would be cheaper when the acquired company's
stock is grossly undervalued as compared to its liquid assets. Felt v. Leasco Data Processing
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See general, J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
AND MARKET COMPETMON 60-71 (1969) (mergers can be cheaper than de novo acquisition).
26. The parties might argue that the delay in attempting to find a new merger partner that
would not raise competitive problems would deprive customers of the new services. Assuming
that the claimed advantages are real and significant, delay might occur only when a class of
merger is forbidden. Thereafter, banks seeking new consumer services would find merger part-
nets that did not create competitive problems. Only ifsuch partners were so scarce that the refusal
of one or two would affect the chances of merger, would there be a continuing risk of delay.
Given the number of banks in the nation, such risks are remote.
27. 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
28. Id at 1259.
29. Id at 1259-60.
30. Id at 1267.
31. Id at 1260.
32. Id at 1268.
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potential competition did not exist;33 moreover, only additional, actual
competitors could eliminate the oligopolistic structure that already ex-
isted in these markets. As the Federal Reserve Board argued, eliminat-
ing Mercantile as a likely entrant into both markets would result in a
loss of some potential competition.34
The Board did not, however, cite all possible anti-competitive ef-
fects. For example, the Mercantile-Pan National combination could so
entrench Pan National's position in Waco and El Paso that potential
competition would be much less effective. New entrants facing the
deeper pocket of the combined firm could find it hard to establish
themselves as even apparent threats.35 Second, the Board did not con-
sider Pan National as either a potential entrant into other markets or a
potential part of a new, state-wide banking entity able to compete with
Mercantile and other major banks for both retail business and larger
business loans.36 These considerations would have magnified, to an
uncertain degree, the anti-competitive potential of the merger.
In response to the Board, the banks claimed that their merger
would benefit the public: "Mercantile has expertise in providing...
services not presently available through Pan National and. . the ac-
quisition would give customers in El Paso and Waco access to Mercan-
tile's special capabilities in commercial lending, credit and corporate
services, international financing, data processing, trust services, small
business/professional lending, and credit life insurance." 37 The strong-
est of these claims was that the merger would provide a way for Pan
National customers to obtain certain services. Of course, nothing pre-
vented Mercantile from offering these services through other banks or
33. See United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 630-32 (1974) (the Court held that
potential competition analysis was especially relevant to banking because "all banking markets in
the country are likely to be concentrated" (emphasis added)).
34. A number of other large banking organizations had not yet entered the El Paso and
Waco markets, so the loss of Mercantile as a potential competitor was less serious than it might
have been. The reversal of the Board's decision turned in large part on this point. See Mercantile
Texas Corp., 638 F.2d at 1267-68.
35. For a description of the entrenchment rationale, see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S.
568 (1967); General Foods v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
36. The Court's decision in United States v. Connectcut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974),
partly validates these theories, and in United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the
Court recognized their applicability, but found them factually unproven in that case. See also
Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Probln. A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 BANKING LJ.
116 (1972). Note that Pan National had entered both the Dallas and Austin markets in 1973 but
later sold those banks. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Mercantile Texas Corp. v. FRB, 638 F.2d 1255
(5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Mercantile Texas Petitioner's Biine].
37. Mercantile Texas Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 6-7.
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stopped Pan National from obtaining the new services by internal
growth or through correspondent banks.s8
As in County National, none of these public benefits depended on
the proposed merger. Pan National could immediately achieve larger
loan limits through any merger with a significant partner. Both large
loans and the other services listed by the merger's proponents were al-
ready offered by other banks or were available through correspondent
arrangements. In short, the Mercantile-Pan National merger would re-
duce competition without providing. any public benefits which were
otherwise unobtainable.
C. Washington Mutual.
The third case, Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. FDIC,39 al-
though preceeding both County-National and Mercantile Texas, in-
volved a much more novel competitive analysis. Washington Mutual
was the largest mutual savings bank in the state of Washington, hold-
ing 22.9% of all thrift institution deposits.4° It wanted to acquire a very
small savings and loan association which had $4.7 million in deposits
and offices located in a middle-sized city in a stagnant area of the
state.4 1 The small S&L had never prospered and had competed poorly
even in its own market.42 Nevertheless, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation focused on aggregate structural concerns and rejected the
merger proposal on competitive grounds.4 3
Only a limited number of large thrift institutions operated in
Washington and entry into this type of financial activity was neither
easy nor frequent.44 Of the large institutions, Washington Mutual was
by far the largest and, like the others, it could expand into new markets
38. Recall that County National proposed the creation of a new $500 million organization in
order to provide such benefits, see supra text accompanying note 20. Mercantile implicitly dispar-
aged such a "small" bank by arguing that a $600 million entity like Pan National needed to merge
with the multibillion dollar Mercantile to provide customers with similar benefits.
39. 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973).
40. Id at 460.
41. Id; see also Brief for Appellees at 6 & n.5, Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC. 482
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Washington Mutual Brief/or Appellees (population
of area declined 6.7% between 1960 and 1970). The area had an estimated population of 62,500.
Washington Mutual Bnieffor Appellees, supra, at 7.
42. The small S&L ranked fourth out of five thrifts in its market. 482 F.2d at 460: Washing-
ton MutualBriefor Appellees, supra note 41, at 5 & n.4. Its net income remained consistently low
and depended on receipts from unrelated activity.
43. See generally Brief for Appellants at 38,44-47, Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 482
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Washington Mutual Brief/or Appellants]. The
"thrift" characterization should not change the competitive analysis. See generally Friedlander &
Slayton, Determination of the Relevant Product Market in Bank Mergers: A Time/or Reassess.
ment? 36 Bus. LAW. 1537 (1981).
44. Cf. Washington Mutual Brie/for Appellants, supra note 43, at 37-47.
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by opening new branches or by acquiring other savings banks. Entry
by acquisition would preempt both assets and an existing market posi-
tion otherwise available for acquisition by smaller competitors to ex-
pand both their geographic reach and asset base. A small acquisition
would probably have a small effect on a $700 million institution, but
could have significant impact on a $100 million one. In banking, econo-
mies of scale generally result from aggregate size, and economies in
advertising generally result from having the geographic reach to match
media dispersal of promotional efforts: the potential competitive ef-
fects of.an acquisition are apparent.
This "proportional effects" analysis necessarily assumes that
growth sources other than mergers are highly limited and that the tar-
get institution would represent a relevant addition to an organization
smaller than the market leader. The FDIC in Washington Mutual
found facts to support both of these assumptions, but failed to acknowl-
edge that the state's middle-sized mutual savings banks occupied rap-
idly growing geographic areas with numerous locations for new offices
in areas more favorable than those occupied by the small target S&L.
45
Given the static character of the market in which the small S&L oper-
ated, as well as its very limited assets, it was also not clear that its ac-
quisition was relevant to the problem of encouraging growth by non-
dominant thrifts. These potential errors might have justifiably led the
courts to conclude that the FDIC's record and evidence could not sup-
port its objection to an acquisition .by Washington Mutual.46 The
Ninth Circuit, however, apparently accepted the FDIC's analysis and
thus impliedly agreed that the merger would have anti-competitive
effects.4 7
As in County National and Mercantile Texas, the banks countered
by arguing that the merger would benefit the public. Acquisition by
Washington Mutual would solve the problem of an aging S&L man-
agement which, because of low pay, could not find successors.48 The
merger would increase the range of services in the small S&L and its
market, and, because of the foothold nature of Washington Mutual's
entry, would also create a potentially more competitive environment in
that local market.49 All of these benefits could occur if the small associ-
ation merged with any of the larger thrifts in the state, but removing
45. But cf. Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 347 F. Supp. 790, 795 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
46. Id at 800. C Southwest Miss. Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Miss. 1979), aft'd,
625 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) (FDIC market definition not supported by evidence).
47. See 482 F.2d at 465.
48. See id at 460; Washington Mutual Briefor Appellees, supra note 41, at 5-6.
49. Washington Mutual Btitffor Appellees, supra note 41, at 6.
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Washington Mutual as a merger candidate would limit the market for
the S&L's assets because there were relatively few large thrifts and
thus, few potential buyers. This restriction of the market for S&L as-
sets might impair the recovery of investments in the S&L, though this
seems unlikely in the context of mutual thrift institutions. On balance,
the FDIC found no unique advantage to the public in the Washington
Mutual transaction and the courts apparently agreed.50 Thus, legally if
not in actual fact, the merger involved some undesirable competitive
effects and no gain to the public interest not otherwise achievable.
D. The Common Effect of the Three Mergers.
In each of these cases the net social effect 5' of the acquisition was
negative. Society usually desires an efficient use of resources in order
to maximize its economic base.52"Inefficiency--the unnecessary expen-
diture of resources-deprives society of resources for socially useful
purposes and distorts allocations of income among otherwise similar
groups. Consequently, public interest analyses should assess putative
social gains to determine their social costs, and weigh both to deter-
mine the net social value of an event. Only gains exceeding their costs
serve the public interest.
When alternative ways to achieve a gain exist, those ways involv-
ing the higher costs are inefficient and, therefore, contrary to the public
interest. The common inefficiency of the County National, Mercantile
Texas, and Washington Mutual combinations was the fact that any pu-
tative gains to the public were achievable by means other than merger
or consolidation; Therefoie,* the competitive costs involved in such ag-
gregation were completely avoidable.53 In this sense, none of the three
transactions served the public interest, and the three decisions all ex-
plicitly or implicitly recognized this.
50. See Washington Mutual Brief Appella, supra note 43, at 3.
51. Note that the focus is broader than economic effect alone in its narrowest sense.
52. See generally R. BORK. ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1970). This discussion uses the term "efficiency" in a general way and not in the limited sense
relating to resource allocations under neo-classical economic theory. Efficiency is a more basic,
and less controversial, policy criterion in this broader sense of "non-wastefulness."
53. Of course, the next best alternative, which does not involve competitive effects, may im-
pose other non-competitive costs. This follows only if the next best alternative is more costly than
the best choice. Given the number of merger options, see supra note 26, and the non-merger
alternatives, see infra note 109, it is unlikely that the next best alternative will cost more. It may,
however, involve loss of competitive advantage, but that is not a socially important cost. To the
extent that the next best option involves significant delay, uncertainty, or inefficiency costs, the
j.'-.- could argue that their combination has positive social advantages. See infra note 109.
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II. THE COURTS' DECISIONS-A CONSTRUCTION OF LEGISLATION
In reviewing these three cases, the courts of appeals unanimously
held that, despite any unfavorable public interest analysis of competi-
tive effects, bank regulators could not deny permission to combine un-
less the combination violated the federal antitrust laws.54 The
application of this standard works a result that, even at first glance,
seems anomalous: an administrative agency, neither charged nor fa-
miliar with antitrust law enforcement, whose usual procedure does not
include adversarial hearings, must find facts demonstrating a violation
of the Clayton Act. 5 This requirement arises from a tenuous chain of
statutory construction unaided by clear legislative history or explicit
policy justification.
A. The Statutory Command to the Bank Regulators.
To reach their conclusions, however strained, the courts of appeals
had to begin with the source of the Federal Reserve Board's or Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation's regulatory power over combination
transactions. For both bank mergers and holding company acquisi-
tions, the statute provides that federal bank regulatory agencies
shall not approve. .. (B) any. . proposed. . . transaction whose
effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or to tend to create a monopoly [Clayton Act standard], or
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, [restraint
standard] unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.
In every case, the responsible agency shall take into considera-
tion the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of
54. In Washington Mutual, the court correctly concluded that no Clayton Act violation ex-
isted. 482 F.2d at 461 (the FDIC opinion had also held the facts did not show a violation). In
County National, the court followed the same rule, but remanded the case to the Federal Reserve
Board to allow it to consider the question first, 654 F.2d at 1259-60, a procedure also followed in
Mercantile Texas, 638 F.2d at 1272.
State antitrust laws are generally not concerned with bank combinations. Even if they were,
banks can easily avoid such state regulation by obtaining national charters. See Bus. WK., Feb.
11, 1980, at 44 (National Charter of Marine Midland Bank to avoid state review of proposed
merger). Holding company acquisitions, however, could be state regulated. See 12 U.S.C. § 1846
(1976) (concurrent state and FRB regulation of bank holding companies). In fact, very little state
regulation exists.
55. Cf. United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (rejecting as irrelevant to antitrust case
prior holdings of FCC as to competitive effects of transaction); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (accord as to holding of Federal Power Commission).
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the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.5 6
The text of the statute suggests several observations to a careful
reader. First, it explicitly limits what the agencies may approve and
does not expressly require approval of any transaction. Second, al-
though courts treat the limiting clauses as embodying only a Clayton
Act standard-"effect in any section of the country may be substan-
tiaily to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly" 57-the
statute does contain a second limitation: "which in any other manner
would be in restraint of trade." The latter clause does not quote the
antitrust laws but does clearly relate to Section 1 of the Sherman Act58
and, presumably, to the court's construction of that act in United States
v. Manufacturers Hanover National Bank.5 9
In Manufacturers Hanover,. two large banks had merged. Al-
though each held only small shares of the relevant market of national
loans, both were active competitors. The court initially found no Clay-
ton Act violation in this market but then observed that because the
merger agreement eliminated competition between major competitive
factors in the market,6 it constituted an unreasonable restaint of trade.
The court also implied, but did not decide, that the merger lacked any
offsetting justifications.61 This meant that a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act had occurred and consequently, despite a prima facie
appearance to the contrary, there was also a violation of the Clayton
Act.62 The defendants did not appeal, 63 leaving the court's decision as
an important indication that elimination of even small market shares in
bank mergers might be improper under the Sherman Act.
A third observation which the County National, Mercantile Texas,
and Washington Mutual courts avoid is that the statute clearly contem-
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1976) (bank mergers) (emphasis added); accord 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1976) (bank holding company acquisition).
57. Compare text with 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("Every contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint of
trade... is hereby declared to be illegal .. ").
59. 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court in Manufacturer's Hanover relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
Legislative committee reports make no express connection between either of these cases and the
restraint standards in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1828 and 1842, but the choice of phrase should necessarily
have included an awareness of both major cases.
60. 240 F. Supp. at 955.
61. Id at 952-54.
62. Id at 955.
63. Instead they obtained a congressional pardon via a grandfather amendment. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 2, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (mergers consumated
pnor to June 17, 1963 were exempted from challenge except when the claim was monopolization);
cf. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
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plates (in the second quoted paragraph)64 that banking agencies can
still reject transactions that meet the quasi-Clayton and Sherman Act
criteria if, having considered one of several factors, the agency finds
that the merger is not in the public interest.65 The most important of
these factors is that of the "convenience and needs of the community to
be served," 66 a term of art used only in banking statutes to describe the
overriding public interest concern for allowing or disallowing new
charters, branches, mergers, acquisitions, or other transactions67
whether pro or anti-competitive.68
In 1966, Congress introduced this "convenience and needs" de-
fense to anti-competitive mergers in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,69 the district
court opinion in Manufacturers Hanover, and the pendency of antitrust
suits against surviving corporations in a number of already consum-
mated bank mergers.70 As is the case with almost any legislative re-
sponse, compromises occurred. The banks were surprised to discover
that the antitrust laws applied to them, were aware that under existing
standards, consummated, anticompetitive mergers were vulnerable,71
and were distressed that the Court in Philadelphia National Bank had
refused in its antitrust analysis to consider arguments justifying that
merger;72 consequently they wanted both exemption for past transac-
tions and a more lenient standard for future ones. Their chief lobbying
opponent, the Justice Department, advocated more pro-competitive
banking policies. To accommodate both views, the statute exempted
all completed transactions and reversed the Supreme Court's refusal to
balance "convenience and needs" claims against anti-competitive ef-
fects; however, it also retained the right to a trial de novo in federal
64. See supra text accompanying note 56 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976)).
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1828, 1842 (1976).
66. 1d
67. The phrase appears only in Title 12, the banking section of the United States Code.
68. For example, at the regulatory level, the "convenience and needs" of the public can out-
weigh objections that a merger could possibly violate the Clayton Act. See First Nat'l Bancorp.,
57 Fed. Res. Bull. 613, 615 (1971) (Despite Justice Department concern, the FRB approved the
acquisition because "the financial condition. . . and management.., of the bank requireld]
approval."). But see infra note 73 (regulatory approval has no collateral estoppel effect as to anti-
trust approval).
69. 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (disallowing merger).
70. Combinations subject to suit included the mergers creating Manufacturers Hanover and
Continental Illinois. See generally Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress and Bank Mergers. 32
LAw & CoNTEmp. PRos. 15, 28 (1967).
71. See, eg., United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
72. 374 U.S. at 370-71.
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court on any transaction the Justice Department found objectionable, 73
and barred consummation of the transaction during litigation.74 The
statute thus ensured more rigorous prospective control over anti-com-
petitive mergers and acquisitions, though tempered by forgiveness of
past transactions, and also allowed a defense the banks had assured
Congress would excuse and justify some of their conduct.
B. The Broader Policy of Regulatory Control Over Bank
Combinations.
The 1966 legislation was only a step in a process begun in the
1930's by which Congress had repeatedly, but not always effectively,
attempted to disfavor bank combinations, especially large ones, absent
extraordinary justifications. This policy first emerged in the 1933 bank
holding company regulations75 and was reinforced in the 1956 Bank
Holding Company Act.76 Congressional reports and proposals repeat-
edly sought a more restrictive merger policy, 77 a desire finally fulfilled
in the Bank Merger Act of 196078 and its 1966 amendments. 79 The
1966 amendments in historic context, reinforce these restrictions on un-
desirable combinations by giving the Justice Department special stand-
ing for de novo review of any combination it questions on competitive
grounds. In no sense are they a license to merge.
After adoption of the 1966 Act, Congress continued to refine the
restrictions on bank combinations. In 1970, it brought single-bank
holding companies under the control of the Federal Reserve and gave
the Board broad discretion to deny them the right to acquire non-bank-
ing interests.80 In 1978, Congress revised the laws governing director
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1976). This confirmed the Supreme Court's view that bank
regulatory agency approval did not bar the later application of antitrust law to the same transac-
tion. See Philadelpha National Bank, 374 U.S. at 352.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1976) (suspension accomplished by the grant of a temporary
injunction).
75. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 5(c), 48 Stat. 162, 166.
76. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842-50
(1976)).
77. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-29 (1965) (supplemental views of Mr.
Douglas, Mr. Clark, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Muskie); Bank Mergers and Concentration of Banking
Facilities: Staff Report to Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. 6 (1952); see also Concentration of Banking in the United States: Staff Report of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Subcomm, on Monopoly, Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Lifland, supra note 70, at 16-17.
78. Pub. L. No. 86-463,74 Stat. 129 (1960) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976));
see Lifland, supra note 70, at 17-20, H.R. ReP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprintedin 1960
U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 1995.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976)).
80. Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1976)),
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interlocks and individual acquisition of banks to ensure the implemen-
tation of its competitive policies in those situations. Individual acquisi-
tions now require agency review for possible competitive effect.,, More
significantly, unaffiliated banks may not have interlocking manage-
ment or directors if one bank has deposits over $500 million and the
other has deposits over $1 billion. 2 Such interlocks appeared to Con-
gress to create potential anti-competitive effects no matter what the ge-
ographic market-a theory extending substantially beyond the usual
antitrust objections and certainly past closing loopholes in the earlier
Clayton Act prohibitions on such interlocks.8 3
A broad policy restricting bank combinations also emerges from
the history of judicial approval of agency decisions denying various
requests on competitive grounds. The most significant decisions, from
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in the early 1960's, upheld Federal
Reserve Board denials of bank acquisitions where the Board had ar-
gued only that the likely effects on a state's banking structure would be
undesirable.8 4 If Congress in the 1966 amendments had meant to deny
this discretion to the Board it could have done so explicitly, but nothing
suggests dissatisfaction with such denials of bank acquisitions. It was
approvals that troubled Congress.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits also ig-
nored the state banking law opposition to banking concentration. In
both Texas"5 and Missouri,8 6 state courts had clearly held competition
and its promotion to be central aspects of public interest regulation in
banking. Such holdings not only reinforced the Supreme Court's simi-
lar conclusion, 87 they also emphasized that even where there is no anti-
trust issue8  competitive concerns may justify decisions upholding
charter grants8 9 and reversing charter refusals.9° These state court in-
81. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 602, 92 Stat. 3635 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1976)).
82. Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. I, 92 Stat. 3672 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (Supp.
V 1981)).
83. Section 10 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), had barred director interlocks be-
tween some classes of banks in the same geographic area. The 1978 legislation expanded those
classes to ban most local market interlocks between financial depository institutions. The general
ban on large bank interlocks goes significantly beyond the specific market focus of antitrust.
84. See First Wis. Bankshares Corp. v. FRB, 325 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1963); Marine Corp. v.
FRB, 325 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1963); Northwestern Bancorp. v. FRB, 303 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962).
85. See, e.g., Chimney Rock Nat'l Bank v. State Banking Bd., 376 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964).
86. See, e.g., Century State Bank v. State Banking Bd., 523 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
87. See infra text accompanying note 104.
88. The state administrative law context avoids the usual substantive antitrust analysis.
89. See, eg., Chimney Rock Nat Bank v. State Banking Bd, 376 S.W.2d at 595, 604 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) (upholding charter grant because of competitive concerns).
90. See, e.g., Central Bank v. State Banking Bd., 509 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (revers-
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terpretations of "public interest" are consistent with the conclusion of
economic theory and empirical investigation 9' that promotion of com-
petition is essential in achieving an efficient, dynamic, and desirable
banking industry.
C. How the County National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington
Mutual Courts Used the Statute and Policy.
In examining the specific statutory language relied on by federal
bank regulators in County National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington
Mutual, the Eighth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits exhibited little, if any,
awareness of the broader statutory contexts-both state and national-
of the agencies' decisions, and largely ignored the earlier case law con-
cerning similar situations.92 Instead, the opinions treated the enact-
ment of the 1966 statute as an isolated event. From this distorted
perspective they then concluded that in passing the law Congress had
objected primarily to varied standards among the federal bank agencies
and that, as a consequence, any construction of the statutory language
should deny discretion to bank regulators.93
As noted earlier, however, the statute expressly contemplates a
two-stage analysis. First, the agency must test the transaction to see if
it violates either the Clayton Act or restraint standards of anticompeti-
tive effect. If the transaction fails this test, the agency must reject the
combination unless it serves the "convenience and needs of the com-
munity." Second, in "every case" the agency must also consider sev-
eral public interest factors, including "the convenience and needs of the
community," in deciding whether to approve the transaction. As the
"every case" language emphasizes, an agency does not abuse its discre-
tion when it rejects a proposal not in accordance with one of these
factors.
If the "convenience and needs" analysis includes competitive ef-
fects, an anti-competitive effect could provide a discretionary basis for
hng regulatory denial of bank's request for bank charter); Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.
1966) (reversing regulatory denial of savings and loan association's request for a charter).
91. See, e.g., supra note 3.
92. Although the FRB briefs in both County National and Mercantile Texas identify North-
western Bancorp, 303 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962) (see supra note 84 and accompanying text) as a
principal authority, County Nat'Respondent's Brie, supra note 17, at iv, Respondent's Brief at iv.
Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. FRB, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Mercantile Texas
Respondent'srit*f], the courts gave passing reference to those decisions. The majority in County
National does not cite the case, although the dissenting opinion does, 654 F.2d at 1261, and the
Mercantile Texas opinion makes no reference to Northwestern Bancorp. or the other cases cited at
.supra note 69.
93. See County National, 654 F.2d at 1256; Mercantile Texas, 638 F.2d at 1261* Washington
Mutual, 482 F.2d at 462-65.
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rejecting a transaction under the second test, completely apart from its
antitrust implications under the first test. On the other hand, if "con-
venience and needs" describes only non-competitive contributions to
banking services such as increased efficiency, or avoidance of non-com-
petitive harms such as failure, regulatory rejection of a transaction on
competitive grounds could occur only under the first test. As their
opinions clearly indicate, the circuit courts in County National, Mercan-
tile Texas, and Washington Mutual adopted this latter, restrictive inter-
pretation. They also completely ignored the statute's second test for
"every case," a test which does not require a violation of antitrust law
standards for the agency properly to reject a combination.
III. THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE THE COURTS
How could these three competent courts reach such curious con-
clusions? In part, because the litigants provided the basic source of
information for the courts and may have had little incentive to present
all possible choices. In addition, appellate litigation often produces
myopic emphasis on case citation and arcane logical argument at the
expense of factual and policy-oriented explanations.
A. W/hat Banks Want to Present.
Banks presumably want to minimize regulatory interference with
their freedom of action94 and thus would prefer legal standards al-
lowing effective judicial review of any denials of their regulatory re-
quests. They would not necessarily object to discretionary standards
for regulatory action, however, if those standards also provided protec-
tion from antitrust objections. Approval has no such effect, however,
because the Justice Department retains its own antitrust route to attack
anticompetitive transactions. Consequently, banks have an unambigu-
ous interest in restricting regulatory discretion. They will argue against
the evils of unfettered agency power over bank transactions, and will
tout more specific standards as feasible, desirable, and statutorily man-
dated. Their argument against discretion has legal support in many
administrative law cases.95 Often the banks can also show that regula-
tors have acted in contradictory ways. For example, the Federal Re-
serve Board had approved a nearly identical combination in the same
94. See County National, 654 F.2d at 1262 (dissenting opinion).
95. See, eg., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1942); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. FTC v. Universal-Rundle
Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967).
Vol. 1983:580]
D.UKE LAW JOURNAL
market just a few months before it denied County National's
application.96
Finally, in arguing against discretion and in favor of well defined
merger criteria, the banks can seize on a standard both judicially famil-
iar and apparently consistent with at least part of the regulators' own
statutory authority--the Clayton Act. These standards, which apply in
any event, are, of course, ones that maximize the banks' freedom.
B. What the Regulators Want to Present.
Historically, bank regulators, like the Star Chamber of old, need
only assure courts that they "know whereof they speak and are satis-
fied" in order to have their positions upheld.97 In merger and acquisi-
tion cases, the only limit the agencies would admit to their discretion to
consider competitive issues as grounds for decision9 is the limit explic-
itly imposed by the first part of their own empowering statute: they
may not approve combinations violating the Clayton Act unless ap-
proval would serve some convenience and need of the public.
This maximization of discretion fits the basic interest of regulators
as decisionmakers. In this respect, the regulator and the bank have
similar interests; only the beneficiary of an enlarged freedom of action
is different. Seeking freedom of action, a regulator also has no incen-
tive to present any alternative standards justifying a particular outcome
if those suggestions could constrain that freedom. Consistent with this
framework, the briefs supporting the regulatory position in County Na-
tional, Mercantile Texas, and Washington Mutual argued that Congress
had conferred and courts had recognized broad discretion in adminis-
trative and banking agencies.99 The briefs presented little or no sup-
port for such broad, unfettered discretion, however. Specifically, they
failed to explain why their claim of legal right was in the public inter-
est-a serious omission in light of congressional concern over misuse of
discretionary approvals in the area of bank mergers.
96. See Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 576 (1978), aff'd mem sub. nonm
Manchester-Tower Grove Community Org. v. FRB, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (cited in
County Nat7 Repondent' r Bef, supra note 17, at 12-13).
97. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (comptroller of currency must explain
reasons for denying bank charter, but denial will be upheld unless "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law").
98. Compare National Bank v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (competition irrele-
vant) with Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 585 (M.D.N.C. 1971)
(branch desirable to stimulate competition).
99. County Nati Respondent r P#,n supra note 17, at 6-7, 30-31; Washington Mutual Brie/for
Appellants, supra note 43, at 6-24, Mercantile Texas Respondent's Brief, supra note 92. at 9-12.
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C. The Consequence of These Advocacy Positions.
Because of the positions of the parties, the primary issue presented
in County National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington Mutual was the
respective agency's scope of discretion. Bent on preserving maximum
discretion, the agencies' argument implicitly conceded that if the stat-
ute did narrowly limit their discretion, then the banks had correctly
described the limiting formula. If the courts rejected the extreme dis-
cretion standard of the agencies as lacking demonstrated public policy
benefits, this left no alternative to the banks' Clayton Act standard as
the criterion for reviewing decisions.
IV. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE
A middle ground exists between the positions advanced in the
County National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington Mutual briefs that
would result in the outcome the agencies sought in at least some cases.
The result could be achieved either by redefining the role of competi-
tion in "convenience and needs" analysis and developing criteria based
on this revised definition, or by providing a clear meaning for the stat-
ute's "restraint of trade" standard.
A. The Convenience and Needs Route.
In presenting their arguments to the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits, neither the banks nor their regulators paid particular attention to
those lines of state and federal cases that have held competition an es-
sential part of "convenience and needs" or public interest analysis.
The state courts have found pro-competitive effects permissible bases
for approving applications.10° In fact, with the exception of a few
branching cases,10 both state and federal courts agree that bank com-
petition is so desirable that its enhancement may alone justify approval
of a new market entry'0 2 or justify denial of anti-competitive applica-
tions as contrary to the public interest.10 3
100. See, eg., cases cited supra notes 85-86, 90; see also Moran v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 203, 33
N.W.2d 772 (1948).
101. Hempstead Bank v. Smith, 540 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1976); National Bank v. Saxon. 268 F.
Supp. 720 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Bank of Haw River v. Saxon, 257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
102. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 585 (M.D.N.C. 1971);
Gold v. Henry, 166 Colo. 401, 443 P.2d 994 (1968); Moran v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W.2d
772 (1948); Central Bank v. State Banking Bd., 509 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1979); Chimney Rock Nat'l
Bank v. State Banking Bd., 376 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
103. Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973) (anticompetitive
effect of new charter not purused on appeal); Industrial State Bank and Trust Co. v. Camp, 284 F.
Supp. 900 (D. Mich, 1968), vacated as moot, 421 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1969); Continental Bank v.
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At the federal level, defining "convenience and needs" has
presented a recurring problem in bank merger litigation. In the leading
case of United States v. Third National Bank of Nashville, however, the
Supreme Court defined "convenience and needs" in a way that in-
cluded competitive effects as an integral part of the standard."14 In
Nashville, the Court considered whether a bank merger that provided a
desirable banking service-improved management-necessarily ad-
vanced the "convenience and needs" of the community without regard
to the other ways in which the community could have obtained the
improved service. If the Court had considered only the gains on their
face, the Nashville Bank would have had an easy "convenience and
needs" defense, as would almost every bank combination. Such a re-
sult, however, would force courts in most merger cases to weigh this
unexamined public "benefit" against probable anti-competitive effects
that often present a prima facie violation of ordinary antitrust stan-
dards. 105 This result would dilute long-standing congressional policy
on bank competition't 6 by introducing a highly ambiguous defense for
almost all prima fade violations of antitrust merger standards. 07 This
cursory definition of "convenience and needs" would also risk social
inefficiency by requiring society to pay for some non-competitive gain
with lost competition or competitive potential when such a cost may
not have been a necessary price for the gain.
To avoid these obvious risks and to effectuate Congress' express
procompetitive poliies, the Nashville Court wisely limited the "con-
venience and needs" defense to cases where it appeared socially appro-
priate.'08 By direct implication, this limitation included a competitive
effects analysis in the definition of "convenience and needs": simply
put, a transaction cannot meet that standard unless it yields the gains to
the public with the least loss of competition possible.'t 9 In Nashville,
Nat'l City Bank, 245 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 401 Pa.
230, 164 A.2d 86 (1960) (market leader denied branch bank).
104. 390 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). See generally Note, Washington Mutual: 4 Judclal Amend-
ment to the Bank MergerlAd f1966, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 639 (1974) (convenience and needs
authorizes agency evaluation of all the competitive effects of a combination).
105. 390 U.S. at 191-192; see also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399
U.S. 350, 372 (1970).
106. See supra text accompanying note 56.
107. This broad defense would require comparison of extremely disparate kinds of "gains"
and "losses". See infra note 109; supra text accompanying note 52. The subjective nature of such
comparisons also generally leads the Court to reject diffuse or wholly non-economically defined
claims in merger cases. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-371
(1963); see also infra text accompanying note 108.
108. 390 U.S. at 189.
109. This definition does not answer the issues raised by difficult hypothetical cases. Suppose,
for example, that only a combination of all banks in the market can achieve certain socially
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the acquired bank had less restrictive ways to solve its management
problems; therefore, the otherwise anti-competitive merger did not
raise any "convenience and needs" interest.' 10 One incidental, but im-
portant consequence for litigation of this approach is that courts need
only to seek verification of claimed public benefits if the parties can
also prima facie satisfy the least-restrictive-alternatives test as well.
Of the County National, Texas Mercantile, and Washington Mutual
opinions only the last discussed Nashville. In doing so, however, the
Ninth Circuit suggested that Nashville's least-restrictive-alternative
analysis of "convenience and needs" applied only to Clayton Act chal-
lenges.III This would mean that the "convenience and needs" phrase
has one meaning in the first paragraphs of sections 1828(c) and
worthwhile advantages. Such combinations presumptively violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). How
can a court in such a case value the loss to competition and the gain to other public interests?
Some scale must be developed, and Congress has provided a basepoint by indicating that a mo-
nopoly may not be justified under the "convenience and needs" defense. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)
(1976). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-31 (2d Cir. 1945)
(monopolist can avoid liability if monopoly is thrust upon it). With this basepoint in mind, a
critical examination of the most likely form of non-competitive gains to society suggests that they
will rarely, if ever, require major anti-competitive mergers for their achievement. Domination of
specific markets is unnecessary to achieve large size, economies of scale, or large capital bases with
which to cover risks. Benston, Hanweck, Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking, 14 J. MONEY,
CREDIT, & BANKING 435, 451 (1982). Moreover, risks requiring large capital bases can be han-
dled efficiently through correspondent relationships. See Knight, Correspondent Banking, FED.
Ras. .BANK OF KANSAS Crry MONTHLY Rv. pt. 1-3 (Nov., Dec. 1970; Dec. 1971). See generally
Carstensen, Regulating Banking in the Public Interest: The Casefor an Open Approach to Charter-
ing and Branching, 57 Tax. L. Ray. 1085, 1089-101 (1979).
110. 390 U.S. at 189. The case was one of antitrust merger law because the government had
shown a Clayton Act violation, see id at 192, but the interpretation of "convenience and needs"
proceeded directly from the banking law.
111. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1973). The court
quoted Nashville regarding the antitrust question where the Supreme Court argued that the "con-
venience and needs" clause does not alter ordinary Clayton Act analysis: "Congress intended
bank mergers first to be subject to the usual antitrust analysis...." Ai at 463-64. The Supreme
Court next stated that if a merger fails the antitrust analysis then the"convenience and needs"
defense may apply. 390 U.S. at 181-82. The passage does not define the standard for "conven-
ience and needs"-a point made by the FDIC at the end of an argument for agency expertise and
discretion. Washington Mutual Brieffor Appellants, supra note 43, at 16-17, 47-50. The FDIC's
argument also implied that the Washville position was one the agency might adopt ("the merger
policy that the FDIC has adopted") and not one required by law, a distinction also designed to
bolster "complete discretion" claims by the agency. The Federal Reserve Board's briefs in County
National and Mercantile Texas make only passing reference to Nashville, County Nat'l Respon-
dent's Brief supra note 17, at 22, 41, 48; Mercantile Texas Respondent's Brief, supra note 92, at 43,
largely to distinguish the case. The Board's brief for reconsideration in County National also takes
this tack, see Petitionfor Rehearing and Suggestionfor Rehearing En Banc, County Nat'l Bancorp.
v. FRB, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc) at 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, and reveals why the
agency's primary claim remains one of broad, almost unbounded, discretion "to deny applica-
tions." Id at 7 (emphasis in original).
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1842(2),112 but a different meaning in the second paragraph of the same
subsections and elsewhere in Title 12. The Supreme Court made no
such distinction in Nashville, nor did the logic of its analysis suggest
that such a distinction ought to exist.
Using the actual Nashville definition of "convenience and needs"
leads to a relatively constrained model of agency discretion. Under this
model, a bank regulator may not find that a proposal serves public con-
venience and needs if it also produces anti-competitive consequences
and if its other ends are achieveable through less anti-competitive
means. This finding would ordinarily lead to a denial of the propo-
sal,1 3 and would provide a limit to agency discretion at least as rigor-
ous as the Clayton Act standard adopted by the County National,
Mercantile Texas and Washington Mutual courts. A Nashville-type
standard, however, would produce different outcomes in specific cases.
For example, it would affirm the FRB denial of County National's ap-
plication and would overrule the earlier decision which had allowed a
comparable transaction."14
Opponents of such a rigorous interpretation of the Nashville stan-
dard might argue that Congress never intended such dramatic restric-
tions on bank combinations. The bank merger statute arguably gives
regulators varying levels of approval discretion: more when anti-com-
petitive effects do not rise to the level of antitrust violations, less when
they do. The phrase "take account of" in the statute's second para-
graph is less commanding than "the agency shall not" in the first." 5
Still, if an agency using the Nashville test finds that "convenience and
needs" are not served, it must advance some other interest to justify the
combination." 6 For example, a bank regulator could find a general
preference in the law for freedom of action, even for bankers, which
would outweigh any small negative effects of transactions not serving
public convenience and needs."t 7 Or an agency might adopt a long-
112. See supra text accompanying note 56.
113. Unless other aspects of the transaction, such as a long range plan by the agency provided
overriding reasons for approval against the general public interest. See infra text accompanying
note 117.
114. Commerce Bankshares, Inc., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 576 (1975).
115. See suzpra text accompanying note 56.
116. As the Nashvllle opinion makes clear, bank regulation should serve the public interest.
390 U.S. at 184. Therefore, it would be a clear abuse of discretion to allow combinations that not
only fail to serve the public interest in the least restrictive manner but that also, in fact, disserve
that interest because of anti-competitive effects.
117. See Carstensen, supra note 109, at 1104-05; see also J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENT-CENTURY UNrrED STATES (1956) (Professor Hurst argues that




term view of competition and- "convenience and needs," and ignore
short run potential anti-competitive effects." 38
' This relatively burdensome view of the "convenience and needs"
defense provided by Congress fits the real-world observation that spe-
cific assertions of the defense are rarely supportable. In lobbying for
the legislation, bankers and bank regulators seemed to have either mis-
stated or not fully analyzed facts." 9 Congress, however, assumed these
facts were true and allowed an exception for any case fitting them--the
"convenience and needs" defense. That cases rarely fit these fact pat-
terns does not disappoint congressional expectations; it merely illus-
trates that the testimony given to Congress did not reflect reality.
For these reasons, a Nashville-type standard does not offend either
the letter or the spirit of the bank merger law. Nor does the approach
bar all combinations, even in its most rigorous formulations. Obvi-
ously, all per se pro-competitive combinations, such as those strength-
ening small competitors by raising them to a more efficient size or those
expanding geographic coverage when other entry appears legally or ec-
onomically infeasible, would merit approval. Other cases would sim-
ply require an inquiry into anti-competitive effects, with the agency
bearing the burden of proof. For example, the FDIC in Washington
Mutual provided a connection between its theory of competitive effects
and the facts of the case too tenuous to justify the finding of anti-com-
petitive effect if the burden were on the agency. Generally, the acquisi-
118. For example, a regulator might allow a merger that would expand the number of retail
offices and reduce actual competition in that market, by projecting that the expansion will eventu-
ally trigger competition or make the new entity a competitor in other markets where it would not
have been otherwise.
119. For example, the President of the American Bankers Association stated that banking
agency decisions in Philadelphia and New York were wholly justified. To amend Bank MergerAct
of 1960: Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcomm on Domestic Finance of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1965) (testimony of Reno Odlin); see also, id
at 280 (statement of Baldwin Maull). A Chicago banker justified an ani-competitive merger by
pointing out that it fulfilled the need for new managers. Id at 211-12 (testimony of Donald Gra-
ham). A California bank regulator suggested that the banking agencies were fully able to consider
competition in their overall analysis. To Amend Bank Merger Act of 1960 Hearings on S. 1698
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate.Comm on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong, 1st Sess., 128-32
(1965) (testimony of John O'Kane); see also id at 74-75 (testimony of G. Russell Clark).
In fact, the justification for big bank mergers vanishes upon examination of most cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Provident Nat1 Bank, 280 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1968) (merger of two Phila-
delphia banks, both smaller than Philadelphia National Bank, held illegal and without conven-
ience and need justification). Moreover, bank agencies often "find" benefits that they later cannot
prove. Since the 1966 amendment, no bank merger found by a court to be unlawfully anticompe-
titive has been upheld on "convenience and needs" grounds. Cf H. R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3,reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 1860, 1861-62 (This report contends
that, absent special defenses, banking agencies would "find it difficult to deal with the floundering
bank."). Thus, the "convenience and needs" defense has had very limited utility.
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tion of small, non-competing banks by very large banks would not
seem to provide sufficiently measurable effects to raise competitive con-
cerns. By default, this leaves another safe harbor for combinations.
B. The Restraint of Trade Route.
Defining "convenience and needs" provides a clear path to bal-
anced and properly limited agency discretion. Defining the prohibition
on approval of any application that "would constitute a restraint of
trade" gives a less clear route. The best point of departure is the Manu-
facturers Hanover decision, which held a merger of large banks unlaw-
ful as a restraint of trade because it eliminated actual competition
between substantial entities.120 Although the parties did not appeal
and the case has not been followed,121 the bank merger statutes mani-
festly codify this approach for bank regulatory decisions. 122 Like the
Nashville version of the "convenience and needs" analysis, this "re-
straint of trade" approach first calls for the regulatory agency to iden-
tify any possible restraints that may result from the combination. Next,
the agency examines the character of the market: are the firms substan-
tial? Finally, the agency may have to decide whether the restraint has
some competitive significance. Certainly, positive findings in all of
these steps identifies a restraint that requires prima facie disapproval of
the transaction unless its gain to convenience and needs outweighs its
trade-restraining effect. This defines "convenience and needs" as only
a defense to prima facie disapproval; such a status does not circumvent
the law the Nashville court has mandated because it must still be read
according to the Nashville definition.
120. 240 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
121. Despite over 400 citations from the time of the Manufaciurers Hanover opinion to the
date of this comment, no court in an antitrust suit has relied on the restraint theory to find a
merger unlawful.
122. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828, 1842 (1976). On the theory that Congress does not enact mere
surplusage, courts should distinguish between the general antitrust standards, 15 U.S.C. § 10
(1970), which apply to mergers in all industries, and the bank merger standards specifically devel-
oped to govern agency review of specific combinations. In order to equate the two standards,
courts must ignore the restraint of trade standard found in sections 1828 and 1842 and pretend
that the Clayton Act standard alone governs agency decisions. Only by so doing can they equate
sections 1828 and 1842 with the general Clayton Act standard applied by the Justice Department
under 15 U.S.C. § 10 (1976)-an analytical step which essentially reduces sections 1828 and 1842
to the status of surplusage and makes "convenience and needs" only a defense rather than a factor
required to be considered in "every case." Cf United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S.
361, 362-64 (1967). The Government's failure to base its action on the Bank Merger Act of 1966
does not render its complaint defective, because "an action challenging a bank merger on the
ground of its anticompetitive effects is brought under the antitrust laws." Id at 363. The Bank
oxorger Act provides a defense of "convenience and needs" to the merger's proponents.
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This formulation of the restraint of trade analysis still differs from
the pure "convenience and needs" rule in two ways. First, the facts of
Manufacturers Hanover support a narrow definition of "restraint of
trade" that might reach only cases in which the parties are actual com-
petitors. Only the merger of actual competitors causes an instantane-
ous loss of competition. Any merger, however, eliminates the acquired
firm's freedom of action and so produces a more broadly stated "re-
straint" on competitive freedom.' 23 A reasonable gloss on this expan-
sive reading would be to require an agency to show that the "restraint"
has some reasonable potential to affect competition. 24
The second difference between the Bank Merger Act's restraint of
trade analysis and the "convenience and needs" test derives from Man-
ufacturers Hanover's emphasis on the absolute size of the entities in-
volved. Each bank in that combination had at least $1 billion in
resources and ranked among the largest banks in the nation. 25 A rule
could follow from this observation: whenever a combination involves
banks so large that each can easily approach the upper limits of econo-
mies of scale without a merger, it involves impermissible restraint.
This rule ignores combinations involving at least one party below the
scale threshold and thus helps to avoid interference in smaller combi-
nations unlikely to have measurable anti-competitive effects (just as the
"convenience and needs" test did) with perhaps a slight bias towards
the banks. 126
C. The Routes Compared and Applied.
Under either Nashville's "convenience and needs" analysis or
Manufacturers Hanover's "restraint of trade" route the County National
case should be reversed. Under a "convenience and needs" analysis,
the County National combination would provide no unique benefits
123. The classic common law of restraint of trade, for example, has dealt repeatedly with
restraints, whether in geographic or product dimensions, limiting future potential competition.
See, ag., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 768 N.E.2d 751, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
124. For example, a restraint on an individual's freedom of action would arguably raise no
competitive concern because it does not have a significant potential to affect market competition,
see Lektro Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982); but see Klor's v. Broadway Hale, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), the actual potential for discernable
competitive effect does not necessarily follow from proof of restraint in the abstract. A presump-
tion of such effect may, however, make sense if the restraint of trade test also includes a test of
significance or degree of effect.
125. 240 F. Supp. at 893-94.
126. If the scale threshold were set, not by the size at which economies of scale become un-
likely or freely obtainable by internal growth at lower cost, but instead by the higher threshold of
"substantiality" prescribed by the new director interlock laws, see supra note 83, the threshold
would be even more favorable to the banks.
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and would create a loss of actual competition, thus producing a nega-
tive effect on the convenience and needs of the community. This nega-
tive effect would bar the merger absent some other public interest- claim
such as long range planning. The arguments in the case, however,
hardly support any such claim. The County National combination also
eliminated actual competition between two banks of such substantial
absolute size that further scale economies appeared unlikely and the
change in size produced by the merger could not, in any event, yield
such economies.12 7 Consequently, the restraint of trade standard
would bar the merger unless the threshold for substantiality were
raised.128
In Mercantile Texas, the "convenience and needs" approach
would again yield objections to the merger. A loss of potential compe-
tition would occur without any offsetting gains not otherwise achieva-
ble. Under a broad "restraint" standard, objection to the merger seems
even more likely than in County National because Mercantile had de-
posits in excess of $2 billion and Pan National had deposits of over
$500 million. If, however, the restraint standard requires a combina-
tion of actual competitors, the merger would easily survive.
As discussed earlier, the Washington Mutual transaction arguably
presents no anti-competitive effect. 129 For that reason, even the ab-
sence of public gain would not necessarily bar the merger as contrary to
the convenience and needs of the community because other policies-
for instance, freedom of action-would require approval. This simply
illustrates that under the "convenience and needs" standard, agencies
must approve neutral cases. On the other hand, a very broad restraint
of trade test could make the same merger seem objectionable because
that test focuses on the loss of the small savings and loan association's
independent competition. A requirement that the restraint also involve
discernable risks to competition would, however, preserve the combi-
nation's neutrality and give a result again paralleling that of the "con-
venience and needs" approach.
Of the two paths, the convenience and needs route provides not
merely a defense for mergers and acquisitions but a positive standard
127. The banks disputed this conclusion by the FRB. See supra note 24. But see supra note 38
(Mercantile Texas banks). Recent analysis has questioned tbe need for mergers to achieve scale
advantages. Benton, Hanweck, Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking 14 J. MONEY, CREDrr &
BANKING 435, 451 (1982) (Most bank mergers are likely to increase operating costs); see also,
Carstensen, supra note 109, at 1098-101.
128. Note that if the director interlock standards set the "substantiality" threshold, see supra
note 126, the Counaty National banks would not qualify as substantial and thus no "restraint"
would be presumed.
129. See sura text accompanying notes 41-45.
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applicable to most bank regulation contexts. The restraint route, how-
ever, appears generally applicable only to larger combinations.
Because both approaches provide useful insights into the proper
scope of agency discretion and the proper outcomes in bank combina-
tions, and because so many different kinds of bank transactions are
possible, accomodating both seems desirable. This is not impossible;
the two approaches can yield consistent outcomes in certain formula-
tions. For example, the restraint standard could be applied only to
those cases in the Manufacturers Hanover mold: combinations of ex-
tremely large banks (combined deposits of more than $1.5 billion, for
example) regardless of market share. This would comport with the re-
cent ban on director interlocks in analogous, non-merger situations 30
and would help articulate the implied statutory support for disfavoring
most large bank combinations absent special factors. 31 Fully satisfy-
ing' the Nashville convenience and needs test could demonstrate such
special factors; otherwise, regardless of market share, large bank com-
binations would be forbidden. 32
The convenience and needs standard would also govern most re-
maining combinations, those not involving substantial participants as
both acquirer and acquiree. Some of these combinations could involve
,sufficient anti-competitive potential to violate the Clayton Act stan-
:dard, but most would not. In the latter cases, the controlling competi-
tive assessment would occur during application of the second
,paragraphs of the bank merger and -bank holding company statutes,
which state that the agency must "take account of" the convenience
and needs of the community. This would not only provide the proper
time for the banks to argue that convenience and needs considerations
support their proposals, it would also provide a proper amount of regu-
latory discretion to approve or disapprove the transaction with more
than the parties themselves in view, because it would allow the regula-
tors to consider, for example, long run planning of market structure.
130. See supra note 83.
131. See Holland, $500 Millikn imitalion on BHCAcquitions?, 97 BANKING L.J. 884 (1980)
(in the late 1970's the FRB seemed to have a policy of denying mergers where the acquiring firm
exceeded $1 billion and the acquired firm exceeded $500 million).
132. Arguably, the restraint of trade standard should not apply when merging banks are not
direct competitors and the combination does not have a discernable effect on potential competi-
tion because such an apparently total bar would preclude arguably innocuous combinations of
large, noncompeting banks with relatively minor market shares. Such combinations, despite an
inherent restraint on separate development, might serve a long run interest in creating and main-
taining a competitively structured banking market. The restraint of trade standard, however, can
easily accommodate this long run interest as an overriding public interest factor fully justifiable
under the Nashdile test.
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V. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' RESULTS-HALF CORRECT
The two suggested approaches to resolving the competing claims
in County National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington Mutual would
reject the legal rule proposed by those cases, and would certainly re-
verse the first two. What, then, can be said of these opinions? They
advance two propositions. First, they reject banking regulators' claims
for an all-but-unlimited scope of discretion. Second, they mandate ap-
proval of bank combinations lacking any social justification in order to
achieve a consistent rule governing those regulators' actual discretion.
In advancing the first proposition, the courts reach a long-overdue
result. The Comptroller and Federal Reserve Board simply cannot jus-
tify the kind of ad hoc, inconsistent decision making that has character-
ized their rulings.133 The bases for banking decisions, especially in the
area of ownership, are not so arcane as to foreclose "inexpert" judicial
review, nor so divergent as to preclude imposition of a consistent, pre-
dictable pattern.
In advancing the second proposition, (choosing a standard limiting
the discretion of federal banking agencies), the three circuits have,
however, erred. No more justification exists for allowing socially ineffi-
cient combinations than for allowing unbridled agency discretion.134
Even if their negative effects are slight and do not violate the antitrust
laws, inefficient combinations do not serve "the convenience and needs
of the community." When principled judicial review must ignore such
effects to achieve consistency, then an overriding justification for the
inefficiency might arise. The Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits as-
sumed that such a justification existed. The narrow arguments that the
contending parties presented the courts undoubtedly contributed to this
conclusion. Nevertheless, the results, though more understandable in
this context, are still incorrect.
Consistency did not require approval of anti-competitive, undesir-
able combinations. The two routes proposed earlier, both grounded in
statute and case law, would have rationally limited agency discretion
133. For the Federal Reserve Board, compare Commerce Bankshares, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 576,(1978). ff'dmem sub nom, Manchester-Tower Grove Community Organization/Acorn v. Board
of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) with County Nat'l Bancorp. v.
FRB, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 763 (1979), vacated en banc, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981). For the
Comptroller, compare National Bank v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (anti-competi-
tive effect of branch not relevant to decision) with Citizens National Bank v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 585 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (pro-competitive effect of branch justified grant).
134. In fact, the two evils produce many of the same losses in competition and public benefit,
and thus should require a similar overriding public interest in rejecting their continued unneces-




while supporting the agency decisions under review in two and provid-
ing a basis for reversing the third. Either route would have provided
the courts a consistent standard for the review of all comparable deci-
sions. Either alternative could have greatly encouraged both public
and private interest actors to seek and receive principled judicial review
of questionable bank combination decisions. Together, the two routes
could provide a comprehensive, consistent method; 35 and, either to-
gether or separately, they would not require social inefficiency.
In its search for consistency, a court should not foolishly embrace
a rule that serves some goals poorly and others well when an alterna-
tive would serve all goals as well or better. The Eighth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits, in seeking to limit the essentially procedural regulatory
discretion of the FRB and FDIC, ignored the substantive public inter-
est in bank competition. The Supreme Court, Congress, and most state
courts, however, regard that public interest in competition as a core
concern in banking regulation. The County National, Mercantile Texas
and Washington Mutual rule mandating merger approvals needlessly
sacrifices that public interest.'3
VI. THE FUTURE OF BANK COMPETITION-THE PROPER
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Banking has begun a series of radical changes that will continue at
least into the next decade. The industry has, in the process, started to
shed the encrusted regulatory process controlling both its ownership
structure and the scope of its business activities. As this process accel-
erates, banks may expand into multistate or nationwide organizations
offering a. far greater range of financial services; 37 savings and loan
associations and credit unions may become much more like banks in
the scope of their business; 38 and non-bank financial institutions may
assume increasingly important roles in many activities. 39
135. But see Reid, Legislation, Regulation, Antitrust and Bank Mergers, 92 BANKING LJ. 6,28
(1975) (calling for congressional action).
136. This conclusion rejects the position of Metzger and Greenfield, supra note 5, at 846, that
in order to constrain discretion it is essential that banking agencies employ only the Clayton Act
standard when denying a combination.
137. See, e.g., GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1981); Ginsberg, Interstate Banking, 9 HdFSTRA L.
REv. 1133, 1175-218 (1981).
138. See, ag., Consumer Checking Equity Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980)
(amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1757 authorizing Savings and Loan Associations and credit un-
ions to offer checking accounts).
139. Major brokerage houses and mutual funds now offer accounts that allow securities invest-
ment savings with interest and checking privileges. Cf Raven, supra note 12, at 389.
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Banking, however, has been externally regulated for a long time
and is not as loosely structured or organized as it might have been in a
laissez faire market.140 Starting from this artificial structure, rapid
change may yield an unnecessarily anti-competitive structure without
even violating the antitrust laws.141 Because of such risks, a regulatory
context emphasizing not only the prevention of gross anti-competitive
effects, but also the positive encouragement of competition, would
probably appeal to the thoughtful observer. A flexible "convenience
and needs" test would, at least in part, fulfill this desire by allowing
assessment of present and future competitive potential, and by permit-
ting denial of transactions that appear to be anti-competitive without
offering otherwise unachievable benefits.142
A second general social concern also encourages rules against un-
justified combinations. Rapid banking evolution may yield more than
a thousand large national financial institutions, or less than a hundred
even larger ones. After reaching some minimum (but substantial) size,
additional growth produces little or no increase to economies of scale
but also no inefficiencies.1 43 Assuming a movement to a national mar-
ket in which efficiency depends upon greater aggregate sizes, the deci-
sion whether to have one hundred or one thousand firms cannot rest on
traditional antitrust analysis. With one hundred actual or potential
competitors, traditional economic theory provides little support for
conclusions of oligopolisic conduct. No antitrust violations will occur;
no significant competitive risks will probably exist.
Still, in the broader social view, the decision whether to have one
hundred or one thousand decisionmakers controlling access to credit
seems important. Even without traditional economic market power, a
decisionmaker still has discretion to act or not to act.144 In finance,
many other economic actors will find these choices of vital interest.
140. Cf United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 627 (1974) ("[A]pplication of the
doctrine [of potential competition] to commercial banking must take into account the unique fed-
eral and state regulatory restraints on entry into that line of commerce.").
141. Cf Halbrook & Savage, Interstate Commercial Banking: The Antitrust Issues, 98 BANK-
ING LJ. 747, 763 (1981) ("[O]nly a court ruling that section 7 requires de novo or foothold entry
when a merger leaves competitive conditions in the marketplace unchanged would enable the
existing antitrust laws to be effective in forestalling rising aggregate concentration. .. ").
142. The standard posited in this comment, the "convenience and needs" test, would not bar
truly neutral transactions.
143. See E PENROSF., THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FiRM (1959).
144. Dewey, 7he New Learning: One Man's VIew, in INDUSTmIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEw LEARNING 1, 13 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston ed. 1974); see alto C. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARxETs (1980); Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Law, 73 COL. L.
REv. 555, 570 (1973); Carstensen and Questal, The Use ofSection 5 of the Federal Trade Comnms-
on Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 864-65 (1978).
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The fewer discretionary decisionmakers controlling credit access, the
greater the effects on others of their discretion, and the higher the risks
that their power will become a major social problem if the number of
credit sources diminishes. Moreover, any decrease in the diversity of
credit grantors, even if it provides some marginal efficiency gain, could
easily trigger harsher direct control over credit discretion.1 45 Indirect
control, by maximizing the number of actors with discretion, would
probably cost less than direct regulation. Either the "convenience and
needs" or "restraint of trade" standard would encourage regulators to
engage in such maximization and avoid the social costs of direct
regulation.
Denying federal banking authorities the chance to consider these'
broader economic and social implications of combinations that pro-
duce no unique benefits means mandating needless social and eco-
nomic costs. To ensure effective bank regulation in the future, bank
agencies must receive guidance exactly opposite from that given in the
Count National, Mercantile Texas, and Washington Mutual decisions.
In their search for a consistent standard of constraint on banking
agency discretion, the Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have under-
standably, but foolishly, adopted one that requires approval of socially
and economically undesirable combinations. Their consistency was
unnecessary. They had alternatives available that could have both con-
strained agency discretion and protected the nation from unnecessary
present-and future--social and economic costs.
145. The risks are already clear in legislation regulating access to personal credit and to neigh-
borhood reinvestment. Such legislation, a rational response to abuse of discretion by market ac-
tors, still imposes significant administrative costs and creates real risks to the dynamic of the
economy. See B. KLEIN, DYNAMIc ECONOMICS 217, 221, 231 (1977).
Vol 1983:580]
